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ABSTRACT 
REVIEW ON THE RCCS FUNCTION TO ANTICIPATE THE STATION BLACKOUT AC-
CIDENT IN RGTT200K. RGTT200K is a conceptual design reactor based on HTGR technology, 
implementing active, passive and inherent safety system. The reactor safety systems are designed in 
“defence in depth” philosophy. RGTT200K has a reactor cavity cooling system (RCCS) which is 
designed to remove the heat from the reactor vessel to the structure of the containment. The RCCS is 
designed to fulfill this role by preserving the reactor vessel under the maximum allowable tempera-
ture during normal operation and protecting the reactor containment structure in the event of failure 
of all active cooling systems. The performance and reliability of the RCCS, therefore, are considered 
as critical factors in determining maximum design power level after heat removal. This paper dis-
cusses the review of RCCS function during the station blackout (SBO) accident. During SBO, all of 
active cooling systems are failed to work and the heat removal is conducted by the RCCS. The SBO 
is an event in which there is no electricity from diesel generator to the blower. The methodology used 
is based on paper review concerning the RCCS function and experiences in Germany, USA, Japan, 
and China. RCCS in RGTT200K has two equipments, first is active mode and second is passive 
mode equipment. Based on that review, the RCCS is capable to maintain the RPV temperature below 
65ºC at normal operation and 125ºC during the SBO. The RCCS keep the fuel of below 1600°C and 
maintain its integrity to avoid radioactivity release to the environment. 
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ABSTRAK 
KAJIAN FUNGSI RCCS UNTUK MENGANTISIPASI KECELAKAAN STATION BLACKOUT 
PADA RGTT200K. RGTT200K adalah reaktor yang didesain berbasis teknologi HTGR. RGTT200K 
mempunyai sistem keselamatan aktif, pasif dan inherent (melekat). Sistem keselamatan RGTT200K 
pada dasarnya mengikuti filosofi pertahanan berlapis. Reaktor ini memiliki sistem pendinginan kavi-
ty atau dikenal dengan RCCS yang berfungsi memindahkan panas dari RPV ke lingkungan sekitar. 
Sistem ini didesain guna menjaga temperatur vessel pada temperatur maksimum yang diinginkan 
baik pada saat operasi normal ataupun kehilangan semua pendinginan aktif. Oleh sebab itu, kinerja 
dan keandalan dari RCCS harus dipertimbangkan sebagai faktor kritis dalam menentukan pengam-
bilan panas pada RPV. Makalah ini membahas kajian fungsi RCCS selama kejadian Station Black-
out (SBO) yang bertujuan untuk mengetahui kapabilitas RCCS selama kecelakaan tersebut. Pada 
saat kejadian SBO diasumsikan seluruh sistem pendinginan aktif gagal, sehingga panas dari RPV 
akan diambil oleh RCCS. Pada kejadian SBO diasumsikan bahwa tidak ada pasokan listrik dari luar 
untuk menggerakkan blower/compressor. Metodologi yang digunakan adalah metode kajian ber-
dasarkan pengalaman negara Jerman, Cina, Amerika, dan Jepang dalam mendesain/
mengoperasikan HTGR. Berdasarkan kajian yang telah dilakukan, RCCS mampu mengambil panas 
pada RPV sehingga temperature pada RPV adalah 60ºC pada operasi normal dan 120°C pada kon-
disi SBO. RCCS juga mampu menjamin temperatur bahan bakar tidak melebihi 1600°C sehingga 
keutuhan bahan bakar terjamin aman dan tidak terjadi lepasan radioaktivitas ke lingkungan. 
Kata kunci: fungsi RCCS, keselamatan reaktor, SBO, RGTT200K. 
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INTRODUCTION  
RGTT200K is a nuclear reactor con-
ceptual design based on Hight Temperature Gas
-cooled Reactor (HTGR) technology. 
RGTT200K stands for ”Reaktor Berpendingin 
Gas Temperatur Tinggi 200 MWth Kogen-
erasi”[1,2] or HTGR with 200 MW thermal out-
put. RGTT200K implements the active, passive 
and inherent safety system. The reactor safety 
systems are generally designed by following the 
”defence-in-depth” philosophy, which includes 
several stages of implementation i.e. prevention 
of failure and abnormal operation, control of 
abnormal operation and detection of failures, 
control of accidents within the design limita-
tions,  control of severe accident conditions of 
installation, including the prevention of the ex-
pansion of the incident and mitigation of the 
consequences, and the mitigation of radiologi-
cal consequences of significant release of radio-
active material [3]. The “defence-in-depth” phi-
losophy on RGTT200K has been applied start-
ing from the multiple barriers in spherical fuel. 
The UO2 (uranium dioxide) kernel has 0.5 mm 
diameter graphite coated. The coated layers 
mitigate and minimize the risk of the fission 
products release of into the outside environment 
during accidents [4,5].  
The reactor safety systems of 
RGTT200K also implement the defence-in-
depth philosophy consisting of active safety 
systems, passive safety systems and inherent 
safety system [5]. Passive safety system means 
that without human intervention and active 
means such as electricity, the system will 
operate automatically. It works using the influ- 
ence of gravity, mass density differences of 
cooling, air pressure differences, and others. 
During the operation of passive safety system, 
it is assumed that there is no electricity supply 
from diesel generator as backup power [6].  
RGTT200K is equipped with a reac-
tor cavity cooling system (RCCS). The RCCS 
is designed to remove the heat transferred 
from the reactor vessel to the structure of the 
containment [7,8]. This RCCS is installed in the 
cavity between the reactor vessel and the con-
tainment. It is designed to fulfil this role by 
preserving the reactor vessel under the maxi-
mum allowable temperature during normal 
operation and protecting the reactor contain-
ment structure in the event of failure of all 
active cooling systems [9]. This paper contains 
a review and discussion regarding the capabil-
ity of the RCCS in case of failure or unavaila-
bility of all other shutdown cooling system. 
Related to the initating event, the station black 
out as occurred in the boiling water reactor 
type in Fukushima will be considered to 
review the RCCS capability to maintain the 
RGTT200K in a safe condition. 
 
THEORY 
Basically the reactor does not need 
any active safety intervention in the event of a 
depressurization loss of forced coolant 
(DLOFC) and a pressurized loss of forced 
coolant (PLOFC). The reactor system auto-
matically reverts back to a normal state after 
the shutdown transient [10]. The goals of safety 
design in RGTT200K are as follows:  
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 There shall be no design based event, either 
from internal reactor or from external 
sources, which would cause anyone living 
near the site boundary to take shelter or be 
evacuated [11]. This goal is achieved with the 
advanced fuel design for RGTT200K as 
shown in Figure 1. The danger to the public 
for any nuclear reactor lies in the fission 
products contained within the fuel and its 








Fig. 1. Coated fuel particle in RGTT200K or 
TRISO [6] 
 
To prevent the radioactive product release, 
the vast majority of the fission products 
must remain within the fuel for all possible 
events as well as events with a very low ex-
pectancy of occurrence. For the RGTT200K 
fuel, this can be virtually guaranteed as long 
as the maximum fuel temperature remains 
below 1600 °C [11,13]. To achieve that, the 
reactor is equipped with inherent safety 
mechanism. Inherent safety means that the 
safety system  relies on the negative coeffi-
cient of reactivity, in which as the reactor 
temperature increases, the reactor core tem-
perature does not exceed 1600 °C. The fuel 
kernel has 4 layers with porous carbon buff-
er (95μm of diameter) layer, inner pyrolytic 
carbon (40μm of diameter), silicon carbide 
barrier coating (35μm of diameter) and 
outer pyrolytic carbon (40μm of diameter) 
[6]. The characteristics of the porous carbon 
coating on the particle TRISO buffer can 
accommodate fission product of UO2 ker-
nel [14]. The function of the other layers is 
to maintain the possibility of the release of 
fission products out of TRISO particles. 
Thus the fuel balls construction can be said 
to be perfect to avoid the fission products 
release to the reactor coolant. The fuel ker-
nel graphite has a melting point of about 
2500 °C, so that in case of fuel failure, the 
temperature raises until 1500 °C. This will 
not affect or damage the integrity of the 
fuel balls or TRISO particles inside. TRI-
SO particles will begin to damage 
(melting) at temperatures above 2000 °C as 









Fig. 2. Correlation between TRISO failure 
fractions and fuel temperature [6,15] 
 
 There shall be no need for moving me-
chanical components to ensure that safety 
targets are achieved. This second goal is 
achieved by using a passive cooling system 
such as RCCS. Passive cooling systems 
have many advantages over normal cooling 
systems [15]. By using a passive system, the 
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design, installation, operation and mainte-
nance of the cooling system is much simpler 
compared to a normal cooling water pump-
ing system. A total of 80 % reduction in pipe 
usage is possible if the passive coo-ling sys-
tem is used [16]. This makes it both very eco-
nomically as well as functionally competi-
tive.  
 Exposure of plant personnel shall be signifi-
cantly lower than the best international va-
lues presently being achieved. It will be a- 
chieved partly by the fuel design and partly 
by the radiation shield as part of the RCCS. 
The radiation shield will be constructed 
from steel that will act as a γ-ray absorber 
and will be placed between the RPV and 
the concrete citadel. The concrete citadel 
surrounding the reactor will also act as in-
sulation. The RCCS design types of all 
HTGR in the world are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. RCCS design types of HTGRs [17] 
 
Reactor RCCS Coolant type Secondary coolant type 
HTTR-Japan Water forced convection Water forced convection 
HTR10-China Water natural convection Air natural convection 
PBMR-South Africa Water natural convection Air natural convection 
GT-MHR-USA Air natural convection No secondary cooling 
MHTGR-USA Air natural convection No secondary cooling 
RGTT200K-Indonesia Water forced convection Air natural convection 
METHODOLOGY 
This paper is a literature study about 
RCCS function during the SBO accident. 
RGTT200K has two parallel water cooling sys-
tems are in surrounding the pressure vessel, 
located in front of the concrete wall of the con-
tainment. This stand pipes connected to the boil 
off tanks to discharge the heat. During the SBO, 
all active cooling systems are assumed to fail 
and the diesel generator is not available to sup-
ply electricity in to primary blower and the 
RCCS water pump. Refer to the Fukushima 
accident, the combination of an earthquake fol-
lowed by a tsunami is initiating event for the 
SBO. The earthquake causes the normal supply 
of electrical power from the electrical grid for 
the RGTT200K nuclear plant to be lost. The 
following tsunami will disable the emergen-
cy diesel generators at the site to provide 
electricity power to essential emergency 
equipments. The study focuses on the thermal-
fluid analysis of the Reactor Cavity Cooling 
System (RCCS) with water flows up the pipes 
to cool the containment.  
During loss offsite power, the RCCS 
pumps did not work, and the heat from the 
RPV is removed water by natural circulation. 
The water is circulated in RCCS because of 
temperature difference between hot water in 
the stand pipe near to the RPV and cold water 
in the storage tanks.  
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Core decay heat is transferred to the reactor 
vessel by conduction and radiation and the 
RCCS absorbs the thermal energy from the re-
actor vessel directly by radiation and indirectly 
from the guard containment atmosphere by 
convection. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
There are two events concerning to 
the lost of helium coolant, first is PLOFC or 
Pressurized Loss of Force Coolant and second 
is DLOFC or Depressurized Loss of Force 
Coolant. PLOFC is an event, in which the heli-
um flowing in the primary system stops and the 
primary system remains pressurized. The pri-
mary helium flow is automatically stopped up-
on reactor shutdown followed by SCS 
(shutdown cooling system) operation to remove 
the after heat. The two safety-related aspects of 
PLOFC are the core heat-up transient with the 
potential for delayed radioactivity release from 
the fuel, and the heat up of metallic structures 
and equipment, particularly in the upper plenum 
(e.g., control rod drives) and other primary sys-
tem pressure boundaries and critical compo-
nents. Since the primary system is still under 
pressure, natural circulation of helium within 
the core helps equalizing the core temperatures 
with the maximum core temperatures migrating 
nearer to the top of the core. The helium recir-
culation would consist of up flow in the (hotter) 
center regions in the fuelled areas and down 
flow perhaps in the cooler core-side areas but 
more pronounced in the cooler reflector areas 
through other coolant channels and spaces be-
tween blocks. The maximum fuel temperatures 
in the PLOFC events are typically well below 
prescribed accident limits. DLOFC is an as-
sumed long-term loss of primary system cir-
culation and helium inventory. In some cases, 
“leak-before-break” assumptions are allowed 
by regulatory authorities for limiting the mag-
nitudes of large-pipe or vessel rupture scenari-
os that need to be considered. The major con-
sequence of a DLOFC is the long-term core 
heat up and potential radioactivity release into 
the confinement, and eventually, to the envi-
ronment (filtered and/or unfiltered). Unlike 
the PLOFC, heat transfer due to helium natu-
ral circulation within the core is negligible. 
Maximum fuel temperatures would typically 
reach peak values in a few days, near the mid-
dle or beltline of the core, and then begin a 7 
days long, slow decrease. In general, the reac-
tor is designed so  that the maximum fuel tem-
perature in a DLOFC should not exceed the 
point where any significant fuel failure is ex-
pected. Typically, the reactor’s design (rated) 
power level is selected based on this calcula-
tion of “best-estimate” maximum fuel temper-
ature in the DLOFC accident. The heat up of 
metallic structures and potential material dam-
age within and outside the primary system 
also need to be evaluated. During a depressur-
ization, some of the primary circulating activi-
ty, including radioactive graphite dust, may be 
released along with the helium. Depending on 
the confinement design and break size, a large 
prompt helium release may go unfiltered. Du-
ring the core heat up process, some fuel fail-
ures may occur although (by design) any heat 
up should result in only minor releases. These 
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delayed, slow releases would typically be fil-
tered (in a confinement design) before exiting 
to the environment. The following piping 
breaks and depressurization would cause pres-
sure distribution transients within the reactor, 
which could be very dynamic for large breaks. 
The pressure redistributions and vibrations 
would need to be evaluated to ensure the struc-
tural stability of the reactor internals as it would 
 cause possible external damage in the reactor 
confinement building and to the RCCS in parti- 
cular. The potential for RCCS failure may be 
greater in the DLOFC event.  RGTT200K has 
2 heat removal systems, which are power con-
version system and shutdown cooling system 
as seen in Figure 3a. Both systems are used to 
remove core heat and decay heat under normal 
operating conditions and those are active coo-
ling system. In the event that two active sys-
tems are not available, the RCCS around the 
RPV serves as cooling system, as shown in 
Figure 3b and 3c as stated. 
Fig. 3. The active SCS and passive RCCS in RGTT200K [18] 
The Reactor Cavity Cooling System 
(RCCS) is designed in RGTT200K to create an 
ultimate heat sink. The RCCS ensures that the 
thermal integrity of the nuclear fuel, the core, 
the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and all equip-
ments in the reactor cavity are achieved. At nor-
mal operation condition, the RCCS ensure that 
the concrete structure surrounding the RPV is 
kept below 65 °C and below 125 ºC in case of 
total loss of the primary helium coolant acci-
dent. The RCCS for RGTT200K is typically a 
safety grade system, either with passive or with 
highly-reliable, redundant forced-convection 
cooling systems, designed to remove heat in the 
core in the unlikely case of failure or unavaila-
bility of the main and all other shut-down 
cooling systems. The objective of most RCCS 
designs is to serve as an ultimate heat sink, 
ensuring the thermal integrity of the fuel, core, 
vessel, and critical equipment within the reac-
tor cavity for the entire spectrum of postulated 
accident sequences. During normal operation 
the temperature achieved in the fuel surface is 
around 1000 °C. In the accident of DLOFC, 
the fuel temperature rise up to approximately 
1500 °C [18], and will decline again caused by 
the reactor cavity cooling system.  
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The RCCS of RGTT200K is used water 
forced circulation during normal operation. 
There are two operation modes of RCCS, which 
are the active and passive mode. The active 
mode means that the cold water is circulated by 
pumping from the water tanks to the stand pipes 
to take the heat from RPV and goes back to wa-
ter tanks. The heat from the hot water then is 
discharged to the environment, through the 
cooling tower. The passive mode does not 
need any force circulation, and the water 
flows by natural circulation because of the 
difference between the hot and cold water 
temperature. The detail conceptual design of 












Fig. 4. Detail of RCCS conceptual design of RGTT200K [18] 
The RCCS is designed with stand 
pipes, which are installed surrounding the RPV. 
Referring to the Fukushima accident, all of 
electrical supply from outside plant are not 
available causing that the primary coolant 
blower fails, and the RCCS active mode also 
fails. On that event, the RPV cooling is con-
ducted via the reactor cavity between the RPV 
and the ground/earth. The air takes the heat 
from RPV by natural convection and is still 
capable to maintain temperature below its de-
sign limit. The cavity is connected to the at-
mosphere directly and the heat can be re-
leased. The fuel temperature will decrease 
until 800 °C within 20 days.  
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With natural circulation, the RCCS 
eliminates the remaining decay heat. The heat is 
transferred by conduction to the pressure vessel 
and then by radiation from the pressure vessel 
to the RCCS and by natural circulation of the 
air inside the reactor cavity. Because the RCCS 
water pumps also are assumed to fail, the heat 
is transferred by radiation and convection from 
the reactor cavity to the earth and surrounding 
areas and by conduction inside the earth, this 
assumption is shown in Figure 3c. This mecha-
nism is perfectly adequate to keep the core tem-
peratures below the maximum design limit. In 
the normal operation, the fuel maximum tem-
perature is 1000 °C. If there is no helium coo-
lant circulated in the primary system, the fuel 
temperature will increase to 1500 ºC. While the 
fuel temperature increases from 1000 to 1500 
ºC, in the same time the RCCS removes the 
RPV heat to continuously decrease the fuel 
temperature until equilibrium temperature. The 
allowable fuel maximum temperature is 1600 °
C. The SBO does not endanger the RGTT200K 
design, because of the RCCS can maintain the 
integrity of the fuel temperature beyond its de-
sign limits. The RCCS absorbs the thermal e-
nergy from the reactor vessel directly by radia-
tion and indirectly from the guard containment 
to atmosphere by natural convection.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
RGTT200K has a reactor cavity coo-
ling system (RCCS), which is equipped to re-
move the heat transferred from the reactor ves-
sel to the structure of the containment. The 
RCCS is designed to satisfy this role by preser- 
ving the reactor vessel under the maximum 
allowable temperature during normal opera-
tion and protecting the reactor containment 
structure in the event of failure of all active 
cooling systems. During SBO, all of active 
cooling system were failed to work and the 
heat removal is conducted by RCCS. By 
design, the RCCS in RGTT200K is capable to 
maintain the RPV temperature below 65ºC at 
normal operation and 125ºC during the SBO, 
and to keep the fuel temperature 1600 °C. 
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